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receiver. Information theoretic bounds [5], [3], [2] for
A-codes give fundamental limits on performance of the
codes. Rosenbaum [3] and Pei [2] independently derived a
bound on the success probability of attackers in spooﬁng
of order i and employed the bound to derive a lower
bound on the key size of A-codes.
In this analysis of an A-code the adversary gathers
information passively by observing valid messages and
then attempts to spoof by sending a fraudulent message
as the (i + 1)th massage, an impersonation attack, or by
replacing the ith valid message with a fraudulent one, a
substitution attack. The success probability of these two
scenarios are the same (provided the receiver will accept
i + 1 messages).
We extend this analysis by considering adversaries
that may be proactive in gathering information. The
adversary might obtain information from the sender by
having the sender transmit a message corrsponding to
source state of the adversary’s choosing or might obtain
information from the receiver by sending a message of
the adversary’s choosing and observing whether or not
the receiver accepts it. Safavi-Naini et al [4] have considered A-codes with such an adversary in the context of
unconditionally secure digital signature schemes (USDS,
Shikata et al [?]). This situation is modelled in terms
of an Authentication Oracle (A-oracle) that provides the
authenticated message corresponding a query source state
in the same way that the sender would and a Veriﬁcation
Oracle (V-oracle) that provides a response accept or reject
to a query message according as the message would be
accepted or not by the receiver. This terminology parallels
that used for schemes relying on computational security.
An attack with access to an A-oracle corresponds to an
adaptive chosen plaintext attack and an attack with access
to a V-oracle corresponds to an adaptive chosen ciphertext
attack.
In this paper we study unconditionally secure A-codes
under the query model and derive information theoretic
bounds on the success probability of a query attacker.

Abstract— Unconditionally secure authentication codes
provide information theoretic security against an adversary
who observes authenticated messages and then wants to
construct a fraudulent message that is acceptable by the
receiver. The attack model for these codes has recently been
strengthened and adaptive adversaries with oracle access
have been introduced. In this paper we give an analysis
of this new model and derive information theoretic bounds
on the success probability and key size of the codes. Our
analysis treats two games that an adversary can play: an
ofﬂine attack in which the adversary is allowed to query a
veriﬁcation oracle and then to construct the spooﬁng query;
and an on-line attack in which the adversary interacts with
the veriﬁcation oracle and wins as soon as he constructs
an acceptable message. We describe the best strategy of the
adversary in each case.

Keywords: Unconditional security, authentication system, A-codes, veriﬁcation oracle.
I. I NTRODUCTION
Unconditionally secure authentication systems provide
security for data and origin authentication when the adversary’s computational power is unknown or unlimited.
Information theoretic security is particularly important
when one considers advances in computation such as
quantum computing and the growing prospect of development of efﬁcient algorithms for ‘hard’ problems. In
an Authentication code (A-code) [1], [5] authenticated
messages (messages) encode states of an information
source (referred to as source states) under a mapping
determined by a key (encoding rule). A-codes are symmetric key systems. The receiver veriﬁes the authenticity
of a message using the same key. In a spooﬁng attack
of order i a message-observing adversary observes i
authenticated messages transmitted by the sender and then
tries to construct a fraudulent message called the spooﬁng
message, that will be accepted by the receiver. We do not
make any limiting assumptions about the computational
power of an adversary.
The performance of an A-code is measured by the
probability that the spooﬁng message is accepted by the
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and keys, respectively. The function f : S × E → M is a
mapping that takes a source state s, a key e and generates
a corresponding message m. For each e ∈ E, the mapping
e : S → M given by e(s) = f (s, e) for all s ∈ S is
injective. We assume that there is a known probability
distribution which models the generation of a sequence
of source states that the sender wants to communicate
to the receiver. We assume that the source states of
such a sequence are distinct. The sender and the receiver
choose a probability distribution on E, their strategy,
which we assume is public, and use it to choose a shared
key e. We denote by E the random variable on sample
space E corresponding to this probability distribution. To
communicate a source state s ∈ S to the receiver, s is
encoded under e to produce message m = e(s) which
is transmitted by the sender to the receiver. We say that
m ∈ M is valid with respect to e ∈ E if m = e(s) for
some s ∈ S. Let M(e) = {m : m is valid under e }.
The receiver accepts a message m as authentic if m is
valid and its corresponding source state has not been
received before. Otherwise m is rejected.

We distinguish two cases according as the attack is online or off-line. An off-line attack may arise, for example,
when the attacker is able to have access for a short time
to the receiver’s means of veriﬁcation but not to the
system in which it is integrated. The attacker would use
this opportunity to gather information and then attack the
system at a later time. An on-line attack may arise, for
example, when the attacker is trying to gain access to a
secure module such as an ATM.
In an on-line attack each query is also a spooﬁng
attempt and the attacker is successful on the ﬁrst occasion
that the receiver accepts a query as a valid message. In
an off-line attack the attacker gathers information from
queries and responses before making a spooﬁng attack
on the live system. In this case a query that results in an
acceptance does not constitute a successful spoof.
We assume that there is a maximum number, L, of
queries that the V-oracle will respond to prior to one
further veriﬁcation (of a ﬁnal spooﬁng attempt). This
reﬂects the fact that information about the key is revealed
by the veriﬁer’s response and that the probability of
succesfully spooﬁng would become equal to 1 if an
unlimited number of queries were responded to.
We begin by considering an adversary who asks exactly
i V-queries, observes the responses of the V-oracle, and
then spoofs. The result of this analysis provides the foundation for the subsequent analysis of all the other attacks.
We view this as a game in which the adversary uses
a strategy to choose each query adaptively, taking into
account all queries and responses previously observed.
We derive two information theoretic bounds. The ﬁrst
bound is a lower bound on the success probably of the
adversary, and can be seen as a generalisation of the
Rosenbaum-Pei lower bound [3], [2] for spooﬁng of order
i. However despite the similarity of the bounds, the bound
in the query case does not lead directly to a bound on the
size of the key space. We consider another information
theoretic quantity, the entropy of the success probability,
and derive a bound on its value that leads to a bound on
the size of the key space.
It is known that an adversary’s expected chance of
spooﬁng may decrease if the adversary observes a message compared to his expected chance of spooﬁng when
he spoofs without any observation. Although under certain circumstances this may also be true in the case of
making a query to a V-oracle, we will show that, unless
there is a unique spooﬁng message which gives maximum
probability of success, the average of the success chance
after making a V-query is at least equal to the success
chance without making that query. Thus, in general, it is
always best strategy to ask the query and then spoof.

III. V- QUERY MODEL
We consider an adversary with access to a veriﬁcation
oracle.
Deﬁnition 3.1: Veriﬁcation oracle (V-oracle)
A veriﬁcation oracle (V-oracle) implements the veriﬁcation algorithm with the veriﬁer’s key e. The oracle
response to a query m ∈ M is T if m ∈ M(e) and
F, otherwise. The query m is called a veriﬁcation query,
or a V-query. The set R = {T, F} is the set of responses.
Let xi = x1 , x2 . . . xi denote a sequence of i elements.
We also use xi to denote {x1 , x2 . . . xi }. We use mi ,
i
qi , ri , (q, r) to denote a sequence of observed messages,
queries, responses, and query and response pairs, respectively.
We consider two games. Game 1 models off-line
attackers. In this attack we assume that the adversary
chooses the number i ≤ L of queries to make before
spooﬁng.
Deﬁnition 3.2: Game 1
The game has two steps.
S1: The adversary adaptively sends i queries qi =
q1 · · · qi to the V-oracle and observes the corresponding
responses ri = r1 , . . . , ri .
S2: The adversary constructs a spooﬁng message m ∈ M
and wins if the veriﬁer accepts the message as authentic.
The adversary uses a strategy τ to choose the queries:
for j = 1, . . . , i, the adversary chooses query qj according to a probability distribution τ(q,r)j−1 (qj ) when
the sequence of previous query and response pairs is
(q, r)j−1 = ((q1 , r1 ), . . . , (qj−1 , rj−1 ). The adversary
chooses the spooﬁng message m according to a probability distribution τ  (q,r)i (m) when the sequence (q, r)i
of query and response pairs has been observed.

II. P RELIMINARIES
An authentication code is a 4–tuple, C = (S, M, E, f ),
where S, M, E are the sets of source states, messages
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determine probabilities p((q, r)i ) that the sequence of
query and response pairs is (q, r)i under startegy τ . We
write (Q, R)i to denote a random variable that takes
values a(q,r)i with respective probabilities p((q, r)i ). Invariably the strategy τ corresponding to (Q, R)i will be
understood from the context.
In an off-line attack, the adversary may choose the
value i at which a spooﬁng attack is made. The adversary’s expected probability of success using strategy τ if
the adversary plays spooﬁng optimally after observing i
responses to messages by the receiver is

Piτ =
p((q, r)i )Pi ((q, r)i )

Note that the spooﬁng query must be different from
queried messages to be accepted. Game 2 models an
online adversary.
Deﬁnition 3.3: Game 2
The adversary adaptively asks up to L + 1 queries,
observing the responses. Each query is also a spooﬁng
message and the adversary succeeds if and as soon as he
asks a query that produces the response T.
The adversary uses a strategy τ to choose the queries:
for j = 1, . . . , L + 1, the adversary chooses the query
qj according to a probability distribution τ(q,r)j−1 (qj )
whenever the sequence of previous query and response
pairs is (q, r)j−1 with the j − 1 responses r1 , . . . , rj−1
all equal to F.
In Game 1 the adversary has a single chance of
spooﬁng but in Game 2 he has up to L + 1 chances
(although he might not use them all because he succeeds
as soon as a response T is received for some query qj
where j ≤ L + 1).

(q,r)i

Let Pi be the maximum of Piτ over all strategies τ and
P the maximum of Pi over i = 0, . . . , L. Then P is the
adversary’s probability of success for an off-line attack if
the adversary optimally chooses the number of responses
to observe before spooﬁng and then uses an optimal
strategy for sending queries and an optimal strategy for
spooﬁng.
Given a sequence (q, r)i−1 of query and response pairs
and query q the probability that r is the response ri to
query qi = q is given by

p(r|(q, r)i−1 , q) =
p(e|(q, r)i−1 )

A. Optimal strategies
Suppose that the adversary has sent a sequence q =
q1 , . . . , qi of queries and observed a sequence (q, r)i =
((q1 , r1 ), . . . , (qi , ri )) of query and response pairs resulting from the adversary’s queries and the corresponding
responses r1 , . . . , ri by the receiver. We write E((q, r)i )
for the set of encoding rules consistent with these observations and p(e|(q, r)i ) for the probability of event e ∈
E((q, r)i ). Similarly, let E(m, (q, r)i ) = {e ∈ E((q, r)i ) :
m ∈ M(e) }. Further, if e ∈ E and m ∈ M we write
γ(e, m, (q, r)i ) = 1 if, when the encoding rule is e,
the receiver accepts m after receiving message sequence
q1 , . . . , qi and γ(e, m, (q, r)i ) = 0 if m is rejected.
The quantity

payoffT (m, (q, r)i ) =
p(e|(q, r)i )γ(e, m, (q, r)i )

e∈E((q,r)i−1 ):e(q)=r

The expected success probability of an adversary that
chooses query qi = q is therefore

P(q,r)i−1 (q) =
p(r|(q, r)i−1 , q)Pi ((q, r)i )
r∈R

where (qi , ri ) = (q, r). The expected success probability
of an adversary who spoofs optimally after making i
queries using strategy τ is therefore

τ(q,r)i−1 (q)P(q,r)i−1 (q)

e∈E

q∈M

is the probability that the adversary will succeed with
spoof m after observing (q, r)i . The maximum probability
of success if the adversary spoofs after observing (q, r)i
is Pi ((q, r)i ) = maxm payoffT (m, (q, r)i ). A strategy τ 
with this success probabilityis called optimal and we say
that the adversary plays spooﬁng optimally. We denote by
m̂ a message such that payoffT (m̂, (q, r)i ) = Pi ((q, r)i ).
We may assume that τ  (q,r)i (m) equals 1 for m = m̂ and
0 otherwise.
The sequence (q, r)i that the adversary observes depends on the encoding rule agreed by the sender and the
receiver and the strategy used by the adversary to send
queries to the receiver. The adversary’s strategy, together
with the probability distributions on the encoding rules,
determines conditional probabilities σi ((q, r)j |(q, r)j−1 )
for j = 1, . . . , i that the sequence of j query and response
pairs is (q, r)j given that the sequence of j − 1 query and
response pairs is (q, r)j−1 . These probability distributions
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This is maximised when τ(q,r)i−1 (q) = 0 whenever
P(q,r)i−1 (q) = P(q,r)i−1 = maxm∈M P(q,r)i−1 (m)
This criterion determines a distribution τ(q,r)i−1 (q) of an
optimal strategy τ . For example the adversary may choose
a query q̂ such that
P(q,r)i−1 (q̂) = maxm∈M P(q,r)i−1 (m)
with probablility τ(q,r)i−1 (q̂) = 1 and all other queries
q = q̂ with probablility τ(q,r)i−1 (q) = 0.
A similar argument with P(q,r)i−1 in the role of
Pi ((q, r)i ) leads to a criterion for a distribution
τ(q,r)i−2 (q) of an optimal strategy τ . Also similarly the
distributions τ(q,r)j (q) for j = i − 2, . . . , 0 of an optimal
strategy τ may be determined. That is, an optimal strategy
is one by which the adversary always chooses a query that
maximizes the expected success probability.
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In an on-line attack, each query is a spooﬁng attempt
and so the adversary continues to make (up to L + 1)
queries only if the response to each previous query is
rejection. Denoting the probability that the adversary is
successful using strategy τ by P τ , the probability that the
adversary is unsuccessful in spooﬁng using strategy τ is
given by

1 − Pτ =
p((q, r)L )(1 − PL ((q, r)L ))

that it depends on the entropy of the key given query and
response information rather than given observed message
information.
Theorem 3.1: Let A be an authentication system and
let Piτ be the probability of success of an adversary who
uses strategy τ and spoofs after observing i query and
response pairs. Then

where the sum is over those sequences (q, r)L such that
rj is rejection for each query qj , j = 1, . . . , L. Let P
be the maximum of P τ over all strategies τ . Then P is
the adversary’s probability of success in an on-line attack
if the adversary uses an optimal strategy. In the event
that each of the ﬁrst L queries produces the response
F the adversary’s best strategy is to choose query qL+1
that maximises the expected probability of success, ie to
choose qL+1 = q(q,r)L such that the expected success
probability

Moreover, equality holds if and only if, for all (q, r)i ∈
(M × R)i with p((q, r)i ) = 0 and all m ∈ M with
p∗ (m|(q, r)i ) = 0, we have payoffT (m, (q, r)i ) = Piτ
and p∗ (m|e, (q, r)i ) is constant for all e ∈ E(m, (q, r)i ).
We have described above an optimal strategy τ in
which the next query qj is determined by the response to
the previous query (and therefore in turn by the responses
to all previous queries). We may write qj = q(rj−1 .
The authentication code and such an optimal strategy
determines a probability distribtion on sequences ri of
responses correspondingto a random variable Ri for i =
1, . . . , L + 1. By Theorem 3.1 we have, for such an
optimal strategy τ

Piτ ≥ 2H(E|M

P(q,r)L (q(q,r)L ) = payoffT (q(q,r)L , (q, r)L )
is equal to the maximum, PL ((q, r)L ) (where rj = F, j =
1, . . . , L). In the event that each of the ﬁrst L − 1 queries
produces the response F the adversaries best strategy
is to choose a query qL that maximises the expected
probability of success

,(Q,R)i )−H(E|(Q,R)i )

Piτ ≥ 2−I(E;M

∗

= 2−I(E;M

∗

|(Q,R)i )

|Ri )

The message-observing attacker obtains information
from valid messages sent across the channel. The querying attacker obtains information from the responses to
the queries. Thus, there are two differences: the former’s
information, unlike the latter’s, depends on the source
state distribution; and the latter’s expected information is
an average of information from valid messages and invalid
messages. So, whereas observing a message may decrease
the success probability of an adversary - because, for example, it might be that the next most likely message to be
observed would have been (had it not been observed) the
best choice for spooﬁng - an adversary always increases
his success probability by making an additional query because his probability of success is an average over the
two possible responses.
The following theorem shows that, for i = 0, . . . , L−1,
Pi+1 ((q, r)i+1 ) ≥ Pi ((q, r)i ). That is, the adversary’s
success probability in an off-line attack can only get
better as more queries are made if an optimal strategy
is adopted.
Theorem 3.2: Suppose that an adversary adopts an
optimal strategy in an off-line attack on an authentication
system A. Then for i = 0, . . . , L − 1,

P(q,r)L−1 (qL ) = payoffT (qL , (q, r)L−1 ) +
(1 − payoffT (qL , (q, r)L−1 )) ×

P(q,r)L−1 ,(qL ,F) (q(q,r)L−1 ,(qL ,F) )
In a similar way, as in the off-line attack, it follows
that, for j = L + 1, . . . , 1, the choice of query qj that
maximises the expected success probability provides an
optimal strategy τ .
B. Bounds on success probability
Consider an adversary who spoofs after observing i
query and response pairs arising from strategy τ . Let
the values p∗ (e, m, (q, r)i ) for e ∈ E, m ∈ M and
sequence (q, r)i of query and response pairs be a joint
probability distribution on E × M × (M × R)i such that,
if γ(e, m, (q, r)i ) =
0 then p∗ (e, m, (q, r)i ) = 0 and,
i
for all e and (q, r) , m p∗ (e, m, (q, r)i ) = p(e, (q, r)i ),
the probability that the encoding rule is e and, for
strategy τ , the sequence of query and response pairs is
(q, r)i . We write M ∗ to denote a random variable that
takes
am with respective probabilities p∗ (m) =
 values
∗
i
e,(q,r)i p (e, m, (q, r) ). The proof of Theorem 3.1 of
Rosenbaum [3] may be adapted to establish the following theorem giving an information theoretic expression
that bounds the probability of success of the adversary.
This bound is completely analogous to the bound for a
message-observing adversary, the only difference being
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Pi+1 ((q, r)i+1 ) ≥ Pi ((q, r)i )
Proof: Suppose that 0 ≤ i ≤ L − 1 and that the
adversary has observed the sequence (q, r)i of query and
response pairs. Let qi+1 be a query such that there exists
a message m̂ = qi+1 with
payoﬀ T (m̂, (q, r)i ) = maxm∈M payoﬀ T (m, (q, r)i )
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C. Bounds on key entropy

The expected success probability of the adversary after
this query is

We ﬁnd a bound on the key entropy by considering
a different game that the adversary may play. Instead
of querying with the objective of being able to spoof
optimally, the adversary may try to query to obtain
the maximum possible amount of information from the
responses. We consider the mutual information between
the key and such responses and so obtain a bound on the
key entropy, that is the size of the key.
Suppose the adversary can ask L queries using strategy
τ and his aim is to maximize the information obtained
from these queries. To ﬁnd the best strategy of the attacker
we will use an approach similar to Section ??. For a
given a the sequence (q, r)i , a query q will have the
response r = T with probability p(T |q, (q, r)i ) and F
with probability p(F |q, (q, r)i . Let Ri denote a binary
random variable associated with this probability distribution. Note that p(r|q, (q, r)i ) = payoffr (q, (q, r)i ) is the
(conditional) probability that the response is r to query q
given the sequence (q, r)i of query and response pairs. We
have payoffF (q, (q, r)i ) = 1 − payoffT (q, (q, r)i ). Then

p(T|qi+1 , (q, r)i )maxm∈M payoﬀ T (m, (q, r)i , (qi+1 , T) +

p(F|qi+1 , (q, r)i )maxw∈M payoﬀ T (w, (q, r)i , (qi+1 , F)

where


p(r|qi+1 , (q, r)i ) =

p(e|(q, r)i )

e∈E((q,r)i ,(qi+1 ,r))

denotes the conditional probability that the response is
r given the sequence (q, r)i and the query qi+1 and
p(e|(q, r)i ) =  p(e) p(e) . But this is
e∈E((q,r)i )



p(T|qi+1 , (q, r)i )maxm∈M

e∈E(m,(q,r)i ,(qi+1 ,T))
i

[p(e|(q, r) , (qi+1 , T))γ(e, m, (q, r), (qi+1 , T))]

+p(F|qi+1 , (q, r)i )maxw∈M
e∈E(w,(q,r)i ,(qi+1 ,F))
i

[p(e|(q, r) , (qi+1 , F))γ(e, w, (q, r), (qi+1 , F))]

H(Ri+1 |q, (q, r)i ) =

payoffr (q, (q, r)i )logpayoffr (q, (q, r)i ) =
−

where
p(e|(q, r)i )
p(e|(q, r) , (qi+1 , r) = 

i
e ∈E((q,r)i ,(qi+1 ,r)) p(e |(q, r) )
i

−

r∈R





r∈R

e∈E(q,(q,r)i )

p(e, r|q, (q, r)i ) ×
logpayoffr (q, (q, r)i )

Hence this is:


maxm∈M

This is the uncertainty in the response to query q
assuming that query and response pairs (q, r)i had been
observed.
Now consider a game where the adversary uses a
strategy τ to select queries and his aim is to learn as
much as possible from the responses. Let

i

[p(e|(q, r) ) ×

e∈E(m,(q,r)i ,(qi+1 ,T))

γ(e, m, (q, r), (qi+1 , T))]

[p(e|(q, r)i ) ×

+maxw∈M

e∈E(w,(q,r)i ,(qi+1 ,F))

Ui ((q, r)i ) = maxq∈M H(Ri+1 |q, (q, r)i )

γ(e, w, (q, r), (qi+1 , F))]

[p(e|(q, r)i ) ×

This is the maximum information the adversary can obtain
from the response ri+1 after the sequence (q, r)i of
e∈E(m,(q,r)i ,(qi+1 ,T))
query and responses. Although querying with a query
γ(e, m, (q, r), (qi+1 , T)) + p(e|(q, r)i ) × that attains this maximum may not lead to maximizing
γ(e, m, (q, r), (qi+1 , F))]
the total information in the sequence of responses, we

can use Ui ((q, r)i ) to obtain a lower bound on this total
= maxm∈M
p(e|(q, r)i ) ×
information and therefore a lower bound on the key
e∈E(m,(q,r)i )
entropy. To this end we let
i
γ(e, m, (q, r) , (qi+1 , r))

Uiτ = min(q,r)i Ui ((q, r)i )
=
p(e|(q, r)i )γ(e, m̂, (q, r)i )
≥ maxm∈M

=

e∈E(m̂,(q,r)i )
Pi ((q, r)i ).

where the minimum is over all query and response
sequences (q, r)i with non-zero probability for strategy
τ.
Given a query and response sequence (q, r)L the
adversary’s best strategy is to choose with non-zero
probability τ(q,r)L (q) only those queries q such that
the information obtained H(RL+1 |q, (q, r)L ) is equal to

It follows immediately that Pi+1 ((q, r)i+1 ) ≥ Pi ((q, r)i )
as an optimal strategy must do at least as well as a strategy
that chooses qi+1 .
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the maximum, UL ((q, r)L ). Given a query and response
sequence (q, r)L−1 the adversary’s best strategy is choose
with non-zero probability τ(q,r)L−1 (q) only those queries
q such that the expected information gain
L−1

)+
H(RL |q, (q, r)

p(r|q, (q, r)L−1 )UL ((q, r)L−1 , (q, r))
r∈R

=
is
a
maximum.
As
UL−1 ((q, r)L−1 )
(maxq∈M H(RL |q, (q, r)L−1 ) and by the deﬁnition
of Uiτ we clearly have that this maximum is at least
τ
UL−1
+ ULτ .
Similarly, for each i = L − 2, . . . , 1, the adversary may
determine a distribution τ(q,r)i of an optimal strategy τ .
An optimal strategy ensures 
that the information obtained
L
by the adversary is at least i=0 Uiτ .
The information obtained from the responses to the
adversary’s queries give information about the key. We
establish a bound on the key entropy in terms of the
information obtained from the responses.
We write χ(e, m, T, (q, r)i ) = γ(e, m, (q, r)i ) and
χ(e, m, F, (q, r)i ) = 1 − γ(e, m, (q, r)i )
Theorem 3.3: Let A be an authentication system and
suppose that the adversary uses a strategy τ such that
τ(q,r)i (q  ) = 0 only if H(Ri+1 |q  , (q, r)i ) = Ui ((q, r)i ).
Then
Ui ((q, r)i ) ≤ H(E|(Q, R)i ) − H(E|(Q, R)i+1 ).
Proof:
Let p(q  , r |(q, r)i ) denote the conditional probability
that the response is r to query q  given that the responses
were rj , j = 1, . . . , i to queries qj , j = 1, . . . , i respectively. Put
Ψq ,r ,(q,r)i (e) =

p(e|(q, r)i )χ(e, q  , r , (q, r)i )
.
payoﬀ r (q  , (q, r)i )

Then Ψq ,r ,(q,r)i is a probability distribution on E.
Now

p(q  , r |(q, r)i ) =
p(q  , r , e|(q, r)i ) =


e∈E(q  ,r  ,(q,r)i )

We now consider the entropy of of the joint distribution
of the random variables Q , R where the adversary
chooses the next query q  ∈ Q according to probability distribution τ  (q  ) and r ∈ R is distributed with
probability dependent on the distribution of q  and the
distribution p(e) on the encoding rules. We are interested
in the conditional entropy H(Q , R |(q, r)i ) conditional
on responses rj , j = 1, . . . , i to queries qj , j = 1, . . . , i,
respectively.
We have
 
H(Q , R |(q, r)i ) = −
[p(q  , r |(q, r)i )
r  ∈R q  ∈M

×logp(q  , r |(q, r)i )]

 
≥−
r  ∈R

=−

p(q , r |e, (q, r) )]

Hence, by Jensen’s inequality [6], we have the following
p(q  , r |(q, r)i )logp(q  , r |(q, r)i )

[Ψq ,r ,(q,r)i (e)payoﬀ r (q  , (q, r)i ) ×
≤
e∈E(q  ,r  ,(q,r)i )
 
i

p(q , r |e, (q, r) )log(payoﬀ r (q  , (q, r)i ) ×

p(q  , r |e, (q, r)i ))]

[p(e|(q, r)i )p(q  , r |e, (q, r)i )
e∈E(q  ,r  ,(q,r)i )
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q  ∈M

[p(e|(q, r)i ) ×

e∈E(q  ,r  ,(q,r)i )
 

p(q , r |e, (q, r)i )χ(e, q  , r , (q, r)i ) ×
log(payoﬀ r (q  , (q, r)i )p(q  , r |e, (q, r)i ))]

[p(e|(q, r)i )p(q  , r |e, (q, r)i )

 

r  ∈R q  ∈M e∈E(q  ,r  ,(q,r)i )

−

×χ(e, q  , r , (q, r)i )logpayoﬀ r (q  , (q, r)i )]

[p(e|(q, r)i )p(q  , r |e, (q, r)i )

 

r  ∈R q  ∈M e∈E(q  ,r  ,(q,r)i )

=−

×χ(e, q  , r , (q, r)i )logp(q  , r |e, (q, r)i )]

[p(e, q  , r |(q, r)i )

 

r  ∈R q  ∈M e∈E(q  ,r  ,(q,r)i )

−

×logpayoﬀ r (q  , (q, r)i )]

p(e, q  , r |(q, r)i )logp(q  , r |e, (q, r)i )

 

r  ∈R q  ∈M e∈E(q  ,r  ,(q,r)i )

=−

 

r  ∈R

=−

q  ∈M


q  ∈M

[Ψq ,r ,(q,r)i (e)payoﬀ r (q  , (q, r)i ) ×

e∈E(q  ,r  ,(q,r)i )
 
i

=

×χ(e, q  , r , (q, r)i )log(payoﬀ r (q  , (q, r)i )
×p(q  , r |e, (q, r)i ))]



=



[p(e, q  , r |(q, r)i )

e∈E(q  ,r  ,(q,r)i )

τ  (q  )



×logpayoﬀ r (q  , (q, r)i )] + H(Q , R |E, (q, r)i )

[p(e, r |q  , (q, r)i )

r  ∈R e∈E((q,r)i )

×logpayoﬀ r (q  , (q, r)i )] + H(Q , R |E, (q, r)i )
τ  (q  )H(Ri+1 |q  , (q, r)i ) + H(Q , R |E, (q, r)i )

q  ∈M



=

τ  (q  )Ui ((q, r)i ) + H(Q , R |E, (q, r)i )

q  ∈M

= Ui ((q, r)i ) + H(Q , R |E, (q, r)i )
where the second to last equality holds provided τ  satisﬁes τ  (q  ) = 0 unless H(Ri+1 |q  , (q, r)i ) = Ui ((q, r)i ).
This can be written as
Ui ((q, r)i ) ≤ H(Q , R |(q, r)i ) − H(Q , R |E, (q, r)i )
= H(E|(q, r)i ) − H(E|Q , R , (q, r)i )
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Thus, since Uiτ ≤ Ui ((q, r)i ) for all (q, r)i by deﬁnition,
Uiτ

≤ H(E|(Q, R)i ) − H(E|Q , R , (Q, R)i )
= H(E|(Q, R)i ) − H(E|(Q, R)i+1 )

if τ(q,r)i (q  ) = τ  (q  )

This means that the reduction in uncertainty about the
key in step i, will be lower bounded by Uiτ for an adversary’s strategy
that maximizes the expected conditional

entropy q∈M τ(q,r)i (q)H(Ri+1 |q, (q, r)i ).
H(E)
=
H(E|(Q, R)L+1 ) +
Since
L
j
j+1
)) we obtain
j=0 (H(E|(Q, R) ) − H(E|(Q, R)
from the bound in Theorem 3.3 a bound on the key
entropy of an A-code.
Theorem 3.4: For an A-code, (S, M, E, f ), we have
the following bound
H(E) ≥

L


Ujτ

j=0

for any adversary strategy τ which chooses queries qj+1
such that H(Rj+1 |qj+1 , (q, r)j ) is a maximum, j =
0, . . . , L.
IV. C ONCLUDING R EMARKS
We have given an analysis of two games played by an
adversary in the verication query model of an A-code and
derived bounds on success probability of the adversary
and the size of the key space. The bounds on the success
probability of a V-query adversary in Game 1 generalise
known bounds on the success probability of a message
observing adversary.
We showed that, in general, asking a query before
spooﬁng is the best strategy. This is not the case for a
message observing adversary where observing a message
may reduce his success chance and the best strategy might
be spooﬁng without observing a message.
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